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THE POLITICS OF UNREGULATION: PUBLIC
CHOICE AND LIMITS ON GOVERNMENT
Peter L. Kahn t
I
Many economists and economically-minded lawyers in recent
years have come to view much governmental regulation of business
as the unfortunate result of a perverse quirk in our political system.,
In this view, representative democracy gives unwarranted weight to
the interests of small and discrete pressure groups, whose interests
may be directly opposed to the interests of the larger public.2
Through an analysis of the effect of the size of a lobbying group on
its political effectiveness,3 advocates of this view (hereinafter de-
scribed as "public choice theory" or the economic theory of legisla-
tion) have concluded that small groups of beneficiaries are more
effective in lobbying for special interest legislation than those larger
groups which pay the bills are in resisting it. As a result, most regu-
t Legal Advisor to the Vice Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission. I
wish to thank Thomas Arthur, Roger Hickey, Seth Kaplan, Errol Meidinger, and Ste-
phen Narkin for their comments. The views I express here are not necessarily those of
the U.S. International Trade Commission, or of any individual other than myself.
1 See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962); THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (P. MacAvoy ed. 1970); WILLIAM
A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); ROGER G. NOLL,
REFORMING REGULATION (1971); PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS (A.
Phillips ed. 1975); WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962);
Gary S. Becker, Pressure Groups and Political Behavior, in CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY:
SCHUMPETER REVISITED 120 (R. Coe & C. Wilbur eds. 1985); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 QJ. ECON. 371 (1983); Stephen
Breyer & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas
Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1973); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurispru-
dence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987); William A. Jordan, Producer Protection,
Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & ECON. 151 (1972);
Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74
AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19
J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 22 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. ECON.
335 (1974); GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971), reprinted in GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 114 (1975).
Indeed, in the view of Kalt & Zupan, supra, at 279, "the economic theory of regulation
long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest."
2 This view is not entirely a new one. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-84 (James
Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320-25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.
1961).
3 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
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lation is viewed as merely special interest legislation designed to
serve some politically powerful group at the expense of the public.
Empirical investigation of many regulatory programs has revealed
large social costs, small public benefits, and (often) substantial
transfers from the public to some discrete group, typically the in-
dustry ostensibly controlled by the regulatory program.4
This view of regulation has become remarkably influential in
the last decade or so. It has had some notable legislative successes,
in particular the deregulation of the trucking industry and the air-
lines.5 It was the chief rationale for the Reagan Administration's
efforts at "deregulation," 6 and its resistance to new regulatory ac-
4 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 44-
48 (1981); ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 110-30 (1983);
INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES, REGULATING BUSINESS: THE SEARCH FOR AN OP-
TIMUM (1978); E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman &John C. Millian, Toward a Theory
of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313
(1985); Robert N. Leone & John E. Jackson, The Political Economy of Federal Regulatory
Activity: The Case of Water Pollution Controls, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION (G. Fromm
ed. 1981); James C. Miller & Thomas F. Walton, Protecting Workers' Hearing: An Economic
Test for OSHA Initiatives, REGULATION, Sept./Oct. 1980, at 31; B. Peter Pashigian, The
Effects of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27J.L. & ECON. 1
(1984). For a critical evaluation of some of this empirical work, see Mark Kelman, On
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public
Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988).
5 For example, the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") effectively "de-
regulated" airport landing rights by forcing a change in the method by which they were
regulated. See High Density Traffic Airports; Slot Allocation and Transfer Methods, 14
C.F.R. §§ 11, 93 (1988). The Office of Management and Budget has offered the eco-
nomic theory of regulation as the rationale for the adoption of the major deregulatory
initiatives of the last decade. See Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of
the President, Regulatory Program of the United States Government, April 1, 1988 to
March 31, 1989, at 6 (1988) [hereinafter OMB Regulatory Program]; Michael E. Levine,
Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1981, at 179-80.
6 The argument was a principal rationale for the centralization of regulatory re-
view authority in the Office of Management and Budget, pursuant to Exec. Order No.
12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601, at 431 (1982). See, e.g., Christo-
pher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986). The OMB review process has significantly decreased
the number of regulations issued, caused some reversal of prior rules, and forced the
agencies to tailor many of the new regulations so that they rely on market incentives
rather than overt direction from the regulatory agency. See OMB Regulatory Program,
supra note 5, April 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986, app. III, exhibits 12-15 (1985). For exam-
ple, the Environmental Protection Agency substantially reduced the restrictiveness of its
proposed asbestos exposure standard in response to OMB commentary. See EPA's Asbes-
tos Regulations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Asbestos: Proposed Mining and
Import Restrictions and Proposed Manufacturing, Importation, and Processing Prohibi-
tiorfs, 51 Fed. Reg. 3738-59 (1986); see also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., INVES-
TIGATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE OVER EPA DOCUMENTS, ABUSES IN THE SUPERFUND PRO-
GRAM, AND OTHER MATrERS 285 (1984) (OMB forced EPA to eliminate proposed rule
1990]
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tions by federal agencies. 7 It has also to some degree altered the
treatment the federal courts accord to regulatory schemes and the
behavior of regulatory agencies.8
Indeed, so successful have these arguments become that there
are now serious proposals to change the legal process or the polit-
ical system to reduce the ill effects of the alleged political bias. For
example, some writers have proposed that the courts impose a rigid
form of the non-delegation doctrine to ensure that Congress, and
not the federal regulatory agencies, originates all but the most de-
tailed regulatory rules; the asserted benefit would be to raise the
costs of these actions by making them as visible as possible, thereby
reducing the likelihood such special interest regulation would be
passed.9 Some urge that the courts work actively to obstruct special
interest deals by explicitly refusing to give them effect; 10 others have
proposed that the courts obstruct the special interest deals made in
Congress by enforcing, not the explicit terms of the deal embodied
dealing with water quality under the Clean Water Act). OMB has also tried to prevent
the implementation of agency rulemaking by delay, for example by delaying the re-
quired notice of proposed rulemaking beyond the statutory deadline. See Environmental
Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986); cf Paul R. Verkuil, Welcome to
the Constantly Evolving Field of Administrative Law, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) ("The
importance of the rulemaking evaluation and paperwork reduction rules of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Analysis of the Office of Management and Budget is diffi-
cult to overstate. As a practical matter, OMB now largely determines the regulatory
agenda and by extension the President's legislative program."). For Presidential actions
implementing deregulation, see Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra; President's Memoran-
dum to Executive Branch Agencies, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 73-74 (Jan. 29, 1981);
Postponement of Pending Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,227 (198 1); Press Release, Pres-
idential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Reagan Administration Regulatory Achieve-
ments 67-68 (Aug. 11, 1983); OMB Regulatory Program, supra note 5, April 1, 1988 to
March 31, 1989 (1988).
7 See OMB Regulatory Program, supra note 5, April 1, 1988-March 31, 1989, at 6
(1988); see also Christopher DeMuth, Regulation, Productivity, and the Reagan Administration's
Regulatory Program, in REGULATORY REFORM RECONSIDERED 21 (G. Daneke & D. Lemak
eds. 1985); DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 1080-81.
8 See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (finding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration's recission of a new motor vehicle requirement for automatic seatbelts and
airbags arbitrary and capricious); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98
HARV. L. REV. 507 (1985).
9 See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glenn 0. Robinson, A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982). The authors concede that this
proposal will discourage truly public-regarding legislation along with "the legislative
production of private goods." Id. at 64. However, they justify this cost by arguing that
there will be little public-regarding legislation in any case. See infra text accompanying
notes 42-47, 56-57.
10 See, e.g., BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980);
Richard A. Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 433, 438
(1982); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
703 (1984) [hereinafter Epstein, Contract Clause];Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregula-
tion: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980); Richard A. Epstein,
Needed: Activist Judges for Economic Rights, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1985, at 32, col. 4.
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in the legislation, but the lofty-sounding purposes often enshrined
in the preambles to legislation." Still others have urged that the
federal courts adopt a more deferential standard of review of agency
action when the agency is removing regulations than when it is im-
posing them. 12 And some have called for the extension of federal
antitrust law to prevent the regulation of economic activity by the
states, on the theory that "state regulation is simply the extension of
private monopolistic activity into the governmental sphere."' 3 In-
deed, the list could go on at some length.14 Even the notorious (and
notoriously unsuccessful) proposed balanced budget amendment
has been justified as a structural reform of the legislative rules to
eliminate an alleged bias in favor of special interest spending.' 5
11 See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public Regarding Legislation through Statutory Inter-
pretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 252-66 (1986). Though Macey
urges that courts continue to apply traditional methods of statutory construction, he
argues that '"judicial review is not now a major obstacle to special interest legislation."
Id. at 225 n.13. He urges the courts to return to the statutory interpretation practices of
an earlier era, which would pose greater barriers to special interest legislation. For a
contrary view of the implications of public choice theory for statutory interpretation, see
Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982). Macey argues that his own proposal will discourage legislation
motivated by private interest, but will leave unimpeded legislation which truly serves the
public interest. The latter claim is dubious. Discerning the true motives and effects of
legislation is difficult at best, as Macey concedes. Macey, supra, at 228 n.24. A system
which relies crucially on the distinction between public regarding and private regarding
legislation can be expected to be extraordinarily cumbersome and inaccurate. As Macey
has noted, even the most venal legislation is likely to be covered with a public interest fig
leaf.
12 Active Judges and Passive Restraints, REGULATION, July-August 1982, at 10 [hereinaf-
ter ActiveJudges]. This article was published anonymously but some have attributed it to
then-Professor Antonin Scalia. See Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 627, 670 (1983) (authored by Peter H.A. Lehner).
13 William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in
the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE LJ. 618, 620 (citingJohn Shepard Wiley, A
Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1986)); see also John Cirace, An
Economic Analysis of the "State-MunicipalAction"Antitrust Cases, 61 TEX. L. REv. 481 (1982).
14 See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 283-329 (1985) (certain tax qnd transfer programs should be constitution-
ally banned to prevent rent-seeking); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality,
63 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) (inferring private rights of action in statutes may vio-
late the terms of agreements reached by interest groups in legislature); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (statutes should be interpreted
narrowly to limit the scope of legislative deals which redistribute wealth to interest
groups); Epstein, Contract Clause, supra note 10 (Contract Clause should be strictly en-
forced to ensure a limited role for government in economic matters); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
15 See S. REP. No. 628, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984). This proposal was made in
JAMES BUCHANAN & RICHARD WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY
OF LORD KEYNES (1977). Buchanan and Wagner argue that the acceptance of Keynesian
economics destroyed one elemt., ' of the American "fiscal constitution," namely a bal-
anced budget rule. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX
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These proposals have emphasized the dangers inherent in poli-
tics, and have tried to ward off such dangers by building institutional
barricades against any affirmative governmental action. In doing so,
they have largely ignored the possibility that an alternative decision
not to enact administrative regulation or legislation, or to remove
existing governmental programs, might owe its success to the same
forces. While the possibility that the interest group model might
result in privately-generated pressure against any government regu-
lation has been formally acknowledged on occasion in the litera-
ture, 16 proposals such as those discussed here would ease the way
for interest groups seeking to oppose public-regarding 17 govern-
ment actions by erecting new barriers to such actions, and would
give such groups incentives to invest their lobbying funds in oppos-
ing such government actions.
This fundamental but essentially unjustified asymmetry in the
treatment of governmental action and inaction has introduced into
the public choice literature a bias against the use of government,
and a corresponding overvaluation of private market outcomes.
Though the underlying theory predicts only the relative political
strength of small special interest groups in seeking their political
goals, and not the nature of those goals or the role of government in
achieving those goals, these proposals work systematically against
government itself. In short, these prescriptions address only the af-
firmative use of government, when the theory in fact directs our at-
tention to the dangers inherent in politics generally, whether
political power is used to achieve or to prevent government action.
There is, after all, no rule of nature that the costs of proposed
governmental actions must be spread more broadly than its bene-
fits, nor a rule that the groups which oppose government action
must be weaker than the groups which support it. Cases surely arise
where the opposite pattern holds. Politicians, lobbyists, and activ-
ists' 8 have long pointed to the power of special interest groups in
(1980), examined a variety of proposals to limit the alleged tendencies of governments
to increase their revenues beyond the desires of their constituents, including constitu-
tional constraints on tax bases and rates.
16 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 14, at 29.
17 This language comes from Mashaw, supra note 10, at 868. The term has been
used simply to denote legislation that is advocated for reasons that connote the public
interest rather than the unique and distinct interests of the advocates. I recognize that
Arrow's Theorem renders problematic the definition of a "public interest" in many
cases. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 813
(1982). Similarly, the difficulties of discerning legislative intent obviously pose problems
here as well. See Macey, supra note 11, at 228-29 n.29. The economic theory of legisla-
tion, however, poses more difficult problems for this definition because it purports to
infer legislative intent from actual effect. See infra note 35.
18 See, e.g., MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION (1982).
[Vol. 75:280284
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opposing regulation. One would expect at least some cases in which
the absence of government, rather than its presence, indicated spe-
cial interest influence. 19 Concern for that possibility is conspicu-
ously missing from the public choice literature.
The asymmetrical emphasis surely reveals a logical misstep.
The public choice model relies for its conclusions only on the distri-
butional effects of policies on competing interest groups. Yet, as
demonstrated by these proposals to reduce the scope and flexibility
of government, the public choice model has served to justify norma-
tive conclusions about those policies, conclusions which do not de-
rive from the model itself.20 There appears, therefore, to be an
implicit assumption: either that the support of a benefitted group is
evidence that the proposed policy contravenes the public interest, 21
or that affirmative governmental action is undesirable for some rea-
son not explicit in the model itself. The former assumption will
19 This surely is not uncommon. See, e.g., id. at 8 (discussing the influence of cotton
and textile interests in reducing the regulatory standards governing fabric flammability).
20 As Macey has observed, nothing in the economic theory of legislation precludes
the possibility that some government actions may represent "wealth-increasing 'public
interest' governmental activities" that should be encouraged. Furthermore, it is all but
impossible to distinguish such activities from the" 'amorally redistributive' rent-seeking
activities" that public choice theory has addressed. Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs
and the Normative Element of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74
VA. L. REv. 471, 472 (1988) (citations omitted). It is nevertheless a startlingly small
number of regulatory programs examined in the pages of theJournal of Law and Economics
which have been found to add much to the public interest. One could easily come away
from a regular reading of this work with the impression that the government acts only to
reduce the national welfare. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Meaning of Liberty: Notes on
Problems Within the Fraternity, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 777, 790 (1985)
("Take almost any government program at random, and a 'special interest' counter-
majoritarian explanation can be found that is more plausible than the public interest
justification given for it.") (citations omitted).
21 The meaning of "the public interest" has never been adequately defined in this
literature. Commentators apparently assume that the "public interest" can be identified
with reaching the Pareto-efficient resource allocation associated with the existing income
distribution. In that context, of course, the political support for a policy is obviously a
poor measure of its efficiency characteristics. However, Pareto-efficient allocations
should not be identified with the public interest, since the Pareto criterion is distribu-
tionally neutral but social welfare functions need not be, and, to touch on reality for a
moment, almost surely are not. Inefficient resource allocations with superior distribu-
tional characteristics may be, and almost surely are, socially preferable to some alterna-
tive allocations which satisfy the Pareto criteria. The political process possibly reflects
social preferences in this regard more adequately than do market processes. The public
choice literature implicitly rejects these politically-made decisions about distribution. It
therefore implicitly presumes either that society does not have meaningful preferences
about distribution, an assertion with which many political actors and voters would disa-
gree, or that the distributional outcomes produced by the political system are less pre-
ferred socially than the existing distribution, an assertion which may be true but which is
both unprovable and irrefutable. See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON &JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LEC-
TURES ON PUBLIC EcONOMics 336-43 (1980). As a result, a policy may be deemed unde-
sirable in the public choice literature either if it alters the existing income distribution or
involves some loss of efficiency in resource allocation, or both. This conclusion relies on
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surely often be wrong. As numerous observers have noted,22 an in-
terest group will almost always support a program by which it bene-
fits; furthermore, one cannot attribute the passage of the legislation
to the interest group's support without confusing correlation and
causation. As to the second possible explanation for this pattern,
the distributional characteristics of policies will generally be related
to social welfare in unpredictable ways. A group's self-interest
sometimes will coincide with the public interest, and sometimes
contradict it.23 No general conclusion seems possible.
Indeed, the deregulatory movement itself-a movement which
in large part originated in the public choice logic24 -provides evi-
dence that government may act in the general interest. After all,
why should the logic of deregulation differ from the logic which ex-
plains regulation?25 Why, then, do deregulatory movements suc-
ceed, if special interest groups oppose them? Either the successes
of the deregulatory movement indicate that some public-regarding
political outcomes succeed for reasons not explained by the
model,26 or that the political environment must have changed so
that deregulation now serves the same private interests which once
sought regulation.2 7 And if this is so, self-serving behavior on occa-
sion coincides with the public interest. The success of the deregu-
an assumption about the nature of the social welfare function, and cannot be logically
derived.
However, in deference to what seems to be standard practice, I shall use the term
"the public interest" in this Article to mean Pareto efficiency defined in terms of the
existing income distribution, ignoring all problems arising from "Second-Best" theory.
See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Kalt & Zupan, supra note 1; Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation
and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALEJ. ON REG. 257, 271 (1987).
23 Commentators often justify the results by asserting that the regulatory policy in
fact is unrelated to its stated goal and works an (intended but unjustifiable) transfer'of
income. In principle, the same concerns should apply to the removal of regulation, and
even to the failure of the government to regulate. Again, a logically necessary step-
some specification of a desired income distribution-is missing.
24 See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
25 Kelman emphasizes that the elimination of governmental programs which for-
mer President Reagan attempted to achieve was often opposed by the special interests
that benefitted from the individual programs, and "[o]ften only the diffuse interest of
taxpayers in general stood on the other side." Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public
Spirit 87 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 80, 87 (1987). Yet such deregulation succeeded to some
degree.
26 Kalt and Zupan find that public-regarding motives are an important part of the
explanation of regulatory legislation. Kalt & Zupan, supra note 1, at 279; see also BER-
NARD ASBELL, THE SENATE NOBODY KNOWS (1978); Kelman, supra note 25.
27 Cass, for example, has suggested that deregulation may be explained in terms of
changing conditions that reduce the benefits of regulation or that increase the costs of
maintaining it. In particular, Cass suggests that deregulation resulted from technologi-
cal developments that made competitive entry into regulated industries easier (thereby
breaking down the cartel which supported and maintained the regulation), cartel break-
down for other reasons, and reduced information costs to non-cartel members concern-
[Vol. 75:280286
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latory movement demonstrates the limits of the model in
prescribing policy.
For this reason, schemes designed to obstruct the power of gov-
ernment to adopt regulation, or which institutionally favor deregu-
lation, risk serious error. Barriers to government action would bias
the political process to favor groups which benefit from an absence
of regulation, regardless of the public interest in that regulation.
Furthermore, those barriers might screen out legislation which
serves the public interest. 28 To impose barriers to government ac-
tion biases the political process against governmental solutions,
even when such solutions are appropriate. Whether unwarranted
non-regulation is more or less a substantial concern than unwar-
ranted regulation is purely an empirical matter. 29
The question raised by such considerations is whether propos-
als which would hinder the enactment of special interest legislation
are the only possible institutional innovations to counter the prob-
lem of special interest politics. 3 0 Obviously, they are not. It may
also be possible to limit the influence of interest groups on politics
generally, and thereby simultaneously make it more likely that
public-regarding legislation is adopted while private-regarding leg-
islation is not. If the harm caused by the failure to enact public-
regarding legislation exceeds the incremental costs of designing and
implementing such unbiased proposals, then we should pursue
those possibilities. The political logic of public choice would appear
more appropriately to justify actions which discourage the involve-
ment of special interest groups in the affairs of the public, or which
handicap their normal political advantages, such as laws setting ethi-
cal standards for public officials or limiting the contributions of in-
ing the costs and benefits of regulation. Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and
Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 476 n.140 (1988).
28 For arguments that regulation may serve public welfare by enhancing economic
efficiency, see WILLIAMJ. BAUMOL, WELFARE, ECONOMICS, AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE
(2d ed. 1965); ROBIN W. BOADWAY, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS (1979); ARTHUR CECIL
PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
29 In an important sense, the empirical question is unanswerable: a consequence of
the Theory of the Second Best, which implies that the efficiency effects of a change in
policy must be assessed in light of every other distortion present in the system, a prob-
lem which renders empirical welfare economics intractable. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The
Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare, in TRADE, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GROwTH:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER 69-90 (J. Bhagwati ed. 1971). Though
the proposed institutional innovations depend on an empirical comparison, that com-
parison has not been undertaken. Yet if we cannot measure the empirical effects, per-
haps we should not presume the direction in which particular policies move the national
welfare.
30 See Epstein, Contract Clause, supra note 10, at 718, for an argument that such
proposals are necessary because they minimize the sum of costs arising from errors in
institutional design, excessive government being more likely than insufficient
government.
1990] 287
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terest groups to political campaigns, than it justifies the current crop
of institutional proposals.
In the remainder of this Article, I first explore the compatibility
of public choice theory with legislative inaction and deregulation. I
then examine the reasons why public choice theorists have chosen
not to pay significant attention to this aspect of the interest group
problem, and conclude that solutions which ignore the problem
have the cost of exacerbating it. Finally, I argue that erecting barri-
ers to government action because of concern about interest group
politics is a serious error, and that such concern is more aptly ad-
dressed by solutions directed at interest group politics generally.
II
The economic theory of politics attempts to understand the na-
ture of government in terms of the costs and benefits facing individ-
uals affected by government action. Because political behavior
quintessentially concerns group interests, this theory focuses on the
relationships among individuals who share common economic inter-
ests and who are thus affected by their environment as a group, and
on the relationships among such groups as they compete through
the political process. The central inquiry is whether identity as a
group alters the behavior of individuals within the group, and
whether the characteristics of the group affect its ability to act on
behalf of its members.
Public choice theory understands legislative outcomes to result
from the supply and demand for political outcomes. The interests
of competing groups may be affected, positively or negatively, by
actions of the government. The government is the monopoly sup-
plier of those outcomes which, because of legal constraints, cannot
be privately supplied. 3' Individuals are presumably willing to pay a
positive price for governmental outcomes which benefit them; other
individuals, with conflicting interests, are willing to pay for opposite
results. 32 The theory assumes that legislators (or the representa-
31 Stigler has listed four "commodities" which the state may provide to an industry.
G. STIGLER, supra note 1, at 115-19. The first is a direct subsidy, an overt transfer pay-
ment to members of the industry. Stigler notes that this will simply induce entry into the
industry, resulting in dissipation of the subsidy among the new entrants, thus making it
an unattractive proposal to the existing industry members. Second, the state may limit
entry into the industry by new rivals. The result would be cartelization of an industry, a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act if performed by members of the industry, but
usually permissible regulation if performed by the government. See Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943). A third possible commodity which may be supplied by government
to the winning bidder are controls over products which substitute for or complement the
bidder's own product in consumption. A fourth is price fixing.
32 Such a price may consist of lobbying costs, contributions, reciprocal support on
other issues, or in similar currency. The group must not only mobilize its own vote; it
[Vol. 75:280288
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tives of other repositories of government power)33 are willing to
supply legislative results to the highest effective bidder. 34 It is
therefore essential to the model that one interest group may seek
governmental inaction just as vigorously as an opposing interest
group may seek governmental action. The presumed legislative
outcome is the result of an implicit (or explicit) contract between
the supplier-legislator and the group which offers the highest effec-
tive price. 35 The bulk of public choice theory consists of speculation
as to how effectively competing groups can collectively express the
must also contribute to the appropriate political party to finance campaigns, to persuade
other voters, possibly to bribe officeholders. See Peltzman, supra note 1, at 213.
33 Though all branches of government are, in principle, available for hire in terms
of currency relevant to their interests, legislators are presumed to be especially vulnera-
ble to this logic. Judges, by constitutional limit, are uninterested in political support or
contributions, and by assumption averse to overt bribes. The interests of the executive
are sufficiently diverse, at least at the federal level, to be beyond reach of any single
interest group. "Bureaucrats," a uniquely slothful species, favor their client industry
largely to avoid being bothered by courts and lobbying groups who would otherwise
disturb their repose.
34 Peltzman, supra note 1, at 211.
35 Public choice theorists would not have us dwell on the plausibility or empirical
basis of this view of political behavior. After all, the positive methods of economics,
which view the verifiability of its implications as the crucial test of a theory, are indiffer-
ent to the possibility of documenting such transactions. Milton Friedman, The Methodol-
ogy of Positive Economics, in EssAys IN Posrrivw ECONoMics 3 (1953). Indeed, I am aware
of no empirical work which attempts to provide evidence of actual legislative bribes.
Consequently, if the effects of legislation benefit a group whose characteristics lead
one to presume political effectiveness, then the theory allows us to presume that some
transaction analogous to a bribe has occurred, though the "bribe" may violate no law.
As Stigler argues, "the announced goals of a policy are sometimes unrelated or per-
versely related to its actual effects, and the truly intended effects should be deduced from the
actual effects." G. STIGLER, supra note 1, at 140 (emphasis in original). This argument has
been crucial to the empirical work performed under the banner of public choice theory,
since that work has focused on the effects of the legislation while ignoring actual obser-
vation of the alleged deals. For example, Pashigian states:
The federal government's role in the regulation of environmental
conditions is not completely clear: many economists would argue that it
is to correct interstate and regional externalities caused by the mobility of
airborne emissions and water discharges. This assessment is widely
shared but may have been reached somewhat prematurely. The effects of
environmental regulation are scarcely known, and no comprehensive as-
sessment can be contemplated at this stage. While the legislation clearly
focuses on the need for an improvement in public health, experience with
other government regulatory programs suggests the stated goals and the
actual effects are not one and the same. The enforcement of regulations
often has effects not readily apparent from a reading of the legislation.
An essential first step in the process of understanding the reasons for
environmental regulation is a careful catalog of the actual effects of envi-
ronmental regulation.
Pashigian, supra note 4, at 1. As Mashaw and Harfst have noted, however, some group
will always benefit from any action, and that group is likely to support that action.
Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 22, at 271. The relevance of this form of empirical support
therefore appears questionable. Correlation does not necessarily imply causation.
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demands of their individual members for legislative results.3 6
The success of a group in outbidding competing interest
groups and achieving legislative success depends largely on the total
level of aggregated demand in the group for a particular legislative
result and on the ability of the group to manifest that demand in an
effective bribe to the legislator. The latter, in turn, is determined by
the costs the group encounters in achieving collective ends. Group
interactions, in general, will not be costless. The size of the bribe is,
from the viewpoint of members of the group, a public good.3 7 A
winning bribe benefits all the group members; the identity of actual
contributors is irrelevant. Each member prefers to let other mem-
bers actually contribute the cost of the bribe, since that member will
benefit equally regardless of the size of his own contribution. Fur-
thermore, each individual will have an incentive to hide the actual
size of his benefit from his fellow group members, since by doing so
he may be able to reduce the size of the contribution the group de-
mands. Thus groups are inevitably subject to transactions costs and
information costs.
The amount of these costs will vary directly with the size of the
group.38 The smaller the group, the more likely it is that an individ-
ual group member will prefer to bear the cost of the action rather
than risk its not occurring. Since that individual, however, by as-
sumption seeks to benefit only himself and does not care about the
welfare of group members, he will seek to ensure that others pay for
the goods the group collectively consumes. The larger the group,
the less likely it is that the individual will be willing to pay for the
group's consumption, and the greater is the individual's incentive to
try to pass the cost to other group members. Larger groups will
therefore encounter more difficulty organizing and securing the de-
sired good (in this case, contributions to the bribe fund) for its
members. Smaller groups will more effectively manifest the demand
of their members for legislative actions. Larger groups, particularly
those as large as the "general public," will be most subject to these
free-rider problems, and may be entirely unable to make effective
bribe offers to legislators. Their chief form of political strength will
36 See M. OLSON, supra note 3, at 33-36.
37 Id. at 9-16.
38 Id. at 28. Smallness is not the only criterion of political effectiveness in this
model. Homogeneity of interests, asymmetry of group membership size, geographic
dispersion of members, and so on, may also affect the ability of group members to make
offers to legislators. As with size, there is no obvious reason-and certainly none within
the confines of the model itself-that groups with varying degrees of those characteris-
tics will consistently prefer any predictable political agenda. Groups will pursue those
political goals which serve the unique interests of the particular group, instead of shar-




come, not through this political marketplace, but through their su-
perior voting power in elections. However, since no member of the
group may benefit sufficiently to bear the costs of learning the poli-
tics of a particular issue, even that form of political action may be
problematic. Therefore, the conclusion that the dynamics of this
process will favor any particular legislative agenda requires an as-
sumption that smaller groups will necessarily favor that agenda,
while larger groups will consistently and predictably oppose that
agenda.
If there were none of the free rider costs described above, all
legislation would be Pareto-improving. Each group could offer the
legislature (nearly) the full surplus value of the aggregate benefit to
its members. The group with the highest bid would also be the
group seeking the socially highest-valued legislative outcome. The
presence of such costs, however, implies that bribes will not fully
reflect group values. Small groups may be able to outbid larger
groups even when their aggregate benefit is less than that of the
larger group. Hence, actual legislative outcomes may predictably
differ from the optimal. 39
III
As this discussion indicates, nothing restricts the application of
this theory of politics to positive acts of legislation. On the contrary,
the model takes explicit account of the conflicting interests of
groups. If Group A benefits from a legislative act, while Group B is
harmed by it, the actual outcome will depend on the size of the com-
peting bribes. Members of Group B will have an incentive to fight
the proposed action. The defeat of the proposed action does not
necessarily reflect the influence of "special interests" less than its
victory. The economic model of regulation presumes a perfect sym-
metry of logic between the successful implementation of legislation
benefitting the group and the successful defeat of legislation harm-
ing the group.
This means we can reverse the conventional political conclu-
sions of the economic theory of regulation while doing no injury to
the theory itself. Cases will almost surely exist in which the benefits
and costs of regulation follow a pattern the opposite of that conven-
tionally supposed. Rather than the costs of a regulatory scheme be-
ing widely spread across a large and politically diffuse "public,"
while benefits of the regulation fall on a coherent and small group,
the opposite pattern will sometimes prevail. If at times a small lob-
39 The only definition of optimality used here is that of Pareto optimality, a defini-
tion that is entirely utilitarian and individualistic. Other views of the socially desirable
may or may not be better served by the special-interest logic.
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bying group will successfully impose a self-serving regulatory pro-
gram on the public, it is also possible that a small group might
successfully oppose a regulatory scheme which the public at large
would favor. There is no reason, then, to presume a priori that the
failure of the government to intervene in some aspect of the econ-
omy represents the defeat of a special interest group. On the con-
trary, special interest groups have much to fear from an activist
government, and surely organize to oppose government action.
40
Indeed, opposition to government actions which harm the group
will often be a more productive investment of lobbying dollars than
is support for actions which help the group. The courts in general
hold administrative agencies to a far lower standard of judicial re-
view when agencies fail to act than when they do affirmatively act.41
Opposition to actions which may harm the group may therefore
have a larger realized payoff than equivalent resources devoted to
the advocacy of positive actions which, if enacted, may eventually be
reviewed by a skeptical court.42 As a result, special interest opposi-
tion to affirmative actions of government may be a more common
focus of lobbying activity than has been generally recognized.
Nevertheless, the attention devoted to such possibilities in the
public choice literature has been minimal. The literature has viewed
the opposition of interest groups to public-regarding governmental
action as enhancing the case for new barriers to government action:
since legislation is unlikely to be enacted if it is public-regarding,
obstacles to government action have little cost.45 This conclusion,
however, is wrong. Barriers to government action inevitably will de-
ter not only special interest legislation, but all government action of
whatever character; the difficulties already facing public-regarding
legislation surely speak against imposing additional barriers. More
importantly, the real basis for that conclusion is an unarticulated but
40 Concern for the exploitation of minority groups by more powerful majorities,
often voiced in the public choice literature, is one expression of these fears. See, e.g.,
George J. Stigler, Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1970).
41 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); ITT World Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 699 F.2d 1219, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Rockford League of Women Voters v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n., 679 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1982); Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1981); WWHT v. FCC, 656
F.2d 807, 809, 817-18 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
42 The courts have applied a more deferential standard of review to agency inaction
than they have to overt agency action (including actions which remove existing regula-
tions). Because there is no record explaining the failure to act, and because the reasons
for inaction are potentially so diverse, inaction has been deemed ill suited to judicial
review. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 606
F.2d 1031, 1046, 1052-53 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Garland, supra note 8, at 516.
43 PETER H. ARANSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE 79-82
(1981); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 41-47 (1982); Aranson,
Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 31 n.133; Macey, supra note 11, at 231.
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crucial assumption: that government inaction is acceptable because
action is generally unnecessary, that government has little valid role
to play. If barriers to government action force us to forego the ben-
efits that government can bestow, those lost benefits are insignifi-
cant.44 This conclusion, of course, does not follow from public
choice theory; indeed, as I shall show below, public choice theory
renders it implausible.
Fundamentally, the decision to design generalized barriers
against government results from a simple logical error. We need
not show that the costs of private market inefficiency are large in an
absolute sense to justify concern about them. We need only show
that private inefficiency is sufficient to outweigh the costs of design-
ing relatively unbiased institutional remedies, in place of the biased
remedies which have appeared in the public choice literature to
date. The case has not been made that only biased remedies are
feasible.45 The question whether substantial inefficiency exists in
private markets is, of course, empirical. In general, the difficulties
of measuring private market inefficiency are such that its size re-
mains largely unexplored.46 The contention that such inefficiencies
are small might be correct.47 Nevertheless, that contention cannot
justify the policy conclusions that have been reached. At the same
time, the empirical importance of unjustifiable government inaction
simply has not been investigated, and thus has been implicitly
minimized. 48
44 See, e.g., Epstein, Contract Clause, supra note 10, at 718.
45 These proposals reach beyond solving only one part of the general problem of
special interest influence, leaving until later the perhaps more difficult problem of en-
suring that a special interest system of government will not foster inappropriate inac-
tion. Rather, many of these proposals are explicitly designed to work in one direction
only. An example is Epstein's proposal that the Contract Clause be used to bar govern-
mental actions which disturb privileges existing under the common law. His proposal is
designed to minimize legislative interference with the common law understanding of
private contract, treating legislative inaction as a protected norm. See id. at 748.
46 See ALLEN V. KNEESE, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF CLEAN AIR AND WATER (1984).
47 This assessment is widely shared among writers in the public choice tradition.
Nevertheless, what is known in the economic literature as the Theory of the Second Best
renders it effectively impossible to measure the inefficiency associated with any policy
position; the actual inefficiency of private markets is empirically unknowable, either ab-
solutely or relative to the alternative. See supra note 29.
48 The conclusion that the positive actions of government empirically are of little
importance is often simply taken as a matter of faith. See, for example, Aranson, Gell-
horn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 37:
It is dismally true that the reality of collective action has little to do
with welfare theory. The theoretical principles of welfare theory... bear
little resemblance to the kinds of collective action actually taken. To re-
view examples of the divergence between the normative theories of col-
lective action and the political reality would be a tedious exercise. Suffice
it simply to assert what ordinary observation will show: the "public
goods" that Congress actually supplies seldom conform to those that
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Epstein, for example, argues that the Constitution was origi-
nally structured to create this very imbalance. 49 To eliminate the
problem of "faction," Epstein asserts, the Framers enacted a system
of checks and balances "whose major function was to place proce-
dural obstacles in the path of legislation." 50 As a consequence, he
suggests that courts use the Contract Clause51 to limit the ability of
government to disturb the property relationships defined in the
common law.52 Though he recognizes that "legislative efforts to tax
or regulate will be resisted by the private parties they hurt,"5 he
concludes that such logic "lend[s] force to the view, evident in both
the framers' general theory and the text they drafted, that govern-
ment power must be curbed," 54 without addressing the implication
that unregulated markets may be unregulated for reasons of private,
and not public, interest. Epstein thus implicitly assumes that the
Framers were unconcerned with the ability of factions to impede the
adoption of desirable legislation.
Similarly, McChesney argues that legislators frequently use the
threat of regulation as a device to extract rent from private parties
eager to avoid regulation of their industry.55 He concludes that the
government's power to regulate should be limited precisely to pre-
vent such rent-extraction. 56 The argument, however, fails to recog-
nize the possibility that the absence of regulation may also be
sought by private parties as a private good which may conflict with
classical welfare justifications define; externalities and market imperfec-
tions are as often the consequences as they are the causes of government
intervention; redistribution programs all too often shift wealth from the
poor to the (relatively) affluent.
49 Epstein, Contract Clause, supra note 10.
50 Id. at 715.
51 "No State shall enter into any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts .. " U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
52 Epstein urges that the Contract Clause be used to bar changes in state law which
would apply even to contracts as yet unformed. Epstein, Contract Clause, supra note 10, at
723-30. He argues that the test for whether a state should be barred from any particular
change in law is the extent to which the possibility of such a law might generate rent-
seeking behavior by parties seeking or opposing the law. Yet forbidding even prospec-
tive alterations of as-yet-unformed contracts obviously prevents the states from cor-
recting errors in state law. Epstein does not address the question of how evolutionary
changes in state common law might be affected by his proposal, nor whether similar
considerations ought to apply to judge-made law. This construction of the Contract
Clause neglects the costs associated with such errors. Furthermore, his idea that this
would somehow free contract terms of the problem of faction is misleading; it neglects
the interest of some factions in preserving state contract law as it stands, and the rele-
vance of the problem of faction to the legal process itself.
53 Id. at 713.
54 Id. at 715. Indeed, he argues, "[gliven the persistence of rent-seeking and self-
interest, the only way to prevent all excesses is to eliminate all government." Id.
55 Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regu-
lation, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
56 Id. at 102-03.
294 [Vol. 75:280
POLITICS OF UNREGULATION
the public interest. As a result, his proposal would prevent essen-
tially socially costless transfers of resources from private parties to
legislators, at the cost of ensuring that those private parties will
achieve their goals of being unregulated, even when non-regulation
involves a social loss to the public.
By posing new barriers to government action while leaving un-
disturbed the ability of government not to act, these proposals
would have the implicit effect of promoting inaction. Simply as a
matter of randomness, these proposals will promote less govern-
ment action: the probability that legislative initiatives will succeed is
lowered, automatically raising the odds that government will fail to
act. But the effects in fact go beyond that. An interest group with
lobbying dollars to invest in influencing government will be led, by
such measures, to invest those dollars in opposing government ac-
tions which harm the group, rather than in promoting government
actions which help it. This is simply a consequence of the economic
law that demand curves are negatively sloped:57 the probability of
success in opposing government action has been raised, and the
probability of success in seeking new favors has been lowered. Op-
position to action therefore will be a relatively more certain invest-
ment than it is now. Proposals such as these do not simply raise the
cost of taking government action; they divert lobbying dollars from
the advocacy of rent-enhancing government action to rent-
preserving government inaction. The proposals do not merely
solve a part of the special interest problem, leaving the more diffi-
cult problem of inaction until later; they reduce the likelihood that
desirable legislation will be enacted. They therefore promote the
public interest in one direction, but work against the public interest
in the other.
IV
Though the special interest logic naturally raises concerns that
government may fail to regulate when it should, public choice schol-
ars have devoted their attention largely to the opposite problem.
The explanation of this paradox lies not in the special interest logic
itself, but elsewhere.58
57 See GARY S. BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY 42 (1971).
58 In important part, of course, the explanation lies in the remarkably narrow and
inadequate description of the motivations of persons working in the public sector which
public choice writers seem consistently to provide. Anthony Downs, for example, as-
sumed that politicians "act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power
which come from being in office." ANTHONv DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOC-
RACY 28 (1957). Niskanen explained that bureaucrats are "budget maximizers." WIL-
LIAM NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971). David
Mayhew saw Congressmen as "single-minded reelection seekers." DAVID M nEw,
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In particular, the explanation lies in a belief that only politics, of
the major systems for making social decisions, contains fundamental
and consistent flaws stemming from imbalances in interest group
power. The available alternative systems for reaching these deci-
sions are, first, the common law, in which judges insulated from
political pressures and self-interest incrementally derive legal rules
constantly tested by an ongoing flow of litigation; and second, the
market, in which the Smithian logic of the invisible hand leads (in
the appropriate circumstances) to the "best" possible resource allo-
cation.59 If the alternatives, either separately or together, can relia-
bly produce consistently desirable results, then posing new
obstacles to the enactment of legislation should be no cause for con-
cern. The opportunities for public-regarding legislation are so min-
imal-and the opportunity for special-interest legislation so
breathtaking-that one scarcely need be concerned if the former is
prevented along with the latter.
If the system of "private law," combined with private markets,
really does define an ideal set of rights and obligations, then simply
preventing governmental action is sufficient. Interest groups them-
selves will successfully resist reductions in their wealth resulting
from governmental action; only their efforts to increase their wealth
must be resisted by the design of governmental institutions capable
of resisting their pressures. The assumed reliability of market- and
CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 17 (1974). Such assumptions, of course, may
have been adopted simply to facilitate building a coherent model of manageable com-
plexity; however, the conclusion that bureaucrats and politicians willingly forego the
public interest to achieve their private ends is surely in part an artifact of the initial
assumptions. It is as if economists assumed at the outset that firms maximize profits, and
concluded that all capitalists must be monstrous cutthroats and thieves.
In fact, persuasive empirical evidence shows that "altruistic, publicly interested
goals" may motivate public actors in large part and that "a view of political actors as
narrowly egocentric maximizers explain[s] and predict[s] legislative outcomes poorly."
Kalt & Zupan, supra note 1, at 279. See also B. ASBELL, supra note 26; CONGRESS OFF THE
RECORD (J. Bibby ed. 1983); JOSEPH E. KALT, THE ECONOMICS AND POLrICS OF OIL
PRICE REGULATION (1981); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology and Log-
rolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1979); S. Peltzman, Constituent Interest
and Congressional Voting, (Feb. 1982) (unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago
Economic and Legal Organization Workshop).
59 These two, of course, are not distinct. The market operates only in the context
of the rights defined by law, as economists have long recognized. See Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347 (1967). But
together they constitute what may be considered a "private" allocation system, in con-
trast to the "public" schemes involving legislative action:
Monopoly, pollution, fraud, mistake, mismanagement, and other un-
happy by-products of the market are conventionally viewed as failures of
the market's self-regulatory mechanisms and therefore as appropriate oc-
casions for public regulation. But this way of looking at the matter is
misleading. The failure is ordinarily a failure of the market and of the
rules of the market prescribed by the common law.
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 343 (1986).
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common-law outcomes minimizes the danger posed by theoretically
biased political rules.
If the "private law" definition of legal rights and obligations is
not reliably optimal, however, then such biased rules can become the
source of serious distortions.60 If the common law has granted
some group an efficiency-distorting favor, then legislative means
must at times be relied upon to reduce those rights.6' Institutions
that not only resist "incorrect" changes in legal rights, but that also
hinder "correct" changes, are intrinsically inadequate. Conversely,
if the common law placed efficiency-reducing burdens on a group,
and market transactions could not overcome those burdens because
transactions were prohibitively costly, then the group's efforts to en-
hance its welfare by seeking "special interest" legislation should not
meet with exceptional obstacles. 62
In short, government may enhance social welfare if social deci-
sion mechanisms that are usually thought of as "non-governmental"
cannot be relied upon to achieve socially correct results. On the
other hand, if those mechanisms are reliable, then obviously there is
little need for politics; restraints on governmental action 63 will ade-
60 There is, of course, a problem arising from general equilibrium theory. Once
even a single distortion exists in equilibrium, adding a second distortion may or may not
bring us closer to the Pareto optimum, depending on the average rate of distortion in
the economy and the degree of substitutability between the goods subject to the original
distortion and the goods to be subject to the new distortion. If there are multiple distor-
tions in the economy, the optimality properties of any new distortion become rapidly
beyond calculation. Thus, in a fundamental sense, all empirical welfare economics is
impossible. As is the custom in discussing the efficiency effects of distortions, we shall
blithely ignore this problem.
61 The Coase theorem tells us that excessive allocations of rights are not a problem
for market efficiency because those rights can be "bought" by the politically disfavored
group. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Applying
that argument, Calabresi has observed that any distortion of efficiency can be circum-
vented by market processes. Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and
Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67 (1968). While that answer suffices for
market failures which would occur but for the absence of transactions costs, it does not
suffice when legislative action has rendered unattainable certain market outcomes such
as child labor or slavery, or for market transactions in the presence of transactions costs.
There is no reason to suppose that legislated legal restraints can effectively rule out
relevant market outcomes while judicial action cannot.
62 Perhaps interest groups have little incentive to promote their own welfare by
seeking to improve the welfare of society as a whole. M. OLSoN, supra note 43, at 41-47.
Nevertheless, there will inevitably be times when a group's private interest will coincide
with the interests of the public. Though the group may care little about its impact on
the public, it will enhance the public welfare by seeking its own. The classic example, of
course, is private economic activity, in which self-interested economic actors are led, "as
if by an invisible hand, to seek an end which was no part of their intention." ADAM
SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (A. Skinner 7th ed. 1979).
63 In such a case, politics becomes analogous, not to voluntary exchange, but to
theft. In the case of normal economic activity, desirable constraints against theft and
compulsion would be present. In the case of political activity, change-reducing con-
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quately protect the public interest from private political power. For
this reason, the case against governmental action on public choice
grounds has as its necessary correlate the proposition that failures
of private economic markets will be few, and that failures of the mar-
ket can and will be appropriately corrected by the common law.
In fact, however, public choice theory raises concerns about the
neutrality of private markets and the common law which are no less
severe than those relating to political action, and for much the same
reasons. If we accept that organizationally effective groups can in-
fluence political outcomes, we must accept the possibility that those
groups may also influence non-political outcomes.
A.
In fact, of course, a case for the optimality of the common law
has been made,64 and its weaknesses vigorously argued. 65 At a min-
imum, the argument draws static conclusions from an inherently dy-
namic process: at best the common law tends in the direction of
optimality, and one can never be sure when optimality has actually
been reached. It is possible that the relevant parameters have been
stable long enough for these tendencies to render the common law
system optimal, but that conclusion is at best speculative and
counterintuitive: changes in the underlying economy generate
changes in optimal rules. Judicial understanding of which rules are
''optimal" may change over time as evidenced by recent theorizing
about tort liability doctrine.66 And differing outcomes in different
jurisdictions present obvious demands for explanation.
To take a well-known example, the common law doctrine of tort
privity insulated nineteenth-century manufacturers from product li-
ability when they lacked a direct contractual relationship with their
product's ultimate consumer. That doctrine limited the ability of
tort law to impose the full costs of unsafe products on the manufac-
turer, and thus to ensure that manufacturers would invest optimally
in safety. 67 Judicial abrogation of the privity doctrine ultimately cor-
straints could be of any form that limit the ability of the political system to act. This is
the goal of the proposals discussed earlier in this Article.
64 Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The IndependentJudici-
ary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); William Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976).
65 See, e.g., John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1820 (1987).
66 Compare, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) with PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
67 Siliciano, supra note 65, at 1827.
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rected this market distortion,68 but prior to abrogation the law
served the interests of some of its more persistent and well-organ-
ized litigants. Manufacturing interests undoubtedly were well repre-
sented in nineteenth-century courts. 69
The example, however, is suggestive. The special interest logic
depends on the proposition that certain groups have characteristics
which give them relative advantages. There is little reason to expect
those advantages to cease at the boundaries of the political system.
Posner has argued that evolutionary systems within the common law
ensure its tendency towards optimality:
An inefficient rule, by definition, imposes larger costs on soci-
ety than an efficient one. This might seem to create incentives to
litigate inefficient rules more, until the courts make them effi-
cient .... [C]ompare two rules, one of which leads to twice as
many accidents as the other with no offsetting reduction in the
cost of safety measures. The inefficient rule will lead to more liti-
gation than the efficient rule, and thus give the courts more op-
portunity to reexamine it. Suppose that, just by chance, the
courts in the course of this reexamination hit on the efficient re-
sult. The number of accidents will fall; the rate of litigation will
fall; and the courts will be less likely to reexamine the rule in the
future.
70
But the understanding of group processes which underlies pub-
lic choice theory leads to a different result. Legal rules in fact will be
reexamined when some group or individual has the incentive and
ability to bring the matter to the attention of the courts. Organiza-
tionally efficient groups have greater ability to sustain continued as-
saults on legal rules they dislike than do less efficient groups. In
short, a rule will be reexamined more often if it harms the interests
of efficient groups, and will be reexamined less often if it harms the
interests only of less efficient groups. Distributionally vulnerable
rules, not inefficient rules, are the more likely to be overturned.
In the legal context, the advantages of organizationally efficient
groups are no less than their advantages in political action.
Whether pooling funds to finance legal battles through trade as-
68 See William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); see also William Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic
Analysis of Products Liability, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 547-49 (1985).
69 This argument has been made by MORTON HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); Grant Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U.
CHI. L. REv. 103 (1970); Gary Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth Century
America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE LJ. 1717 (1981).
70 R. POSNER, supra note 59, at 527-29. For similar arguments, see William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979);
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. LEGAL STUD.
65 (1977); Paul Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
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sociations, or adopting a joint litigation strategy to press a common
viewpoint, they will have incentives to pool resources more success-
fully than their opponents: after all, they are the very groups able to
pool resources successfully in the political context. Since such
groups tend to be smaller then their opponents, a successful out-
come in litigation is more valuable as a private good to the members
of such groups than it would be for any one of their more numerous
opponents. Each member will capture a larger share of the returns
from the establishment of a favorable rule than their opponents.
Not only are the costs of achieving group-serving litigational
goals relatively low for these groups, but the incentives to pursue
such an agenda are often relatively great. Calabresi has demon-
strated7 that to achieve economically efficient rules with respect to
involuntary interactions, liability should in general be placed on the
party with the lowest costs of avoiding the litigation-generating
event. 72 Yet such costs are not inherently different from the costs
that define political effectiveness in the public-choice model. Both
fundamentally involve the ability to minimize transactions costs,
whether in terms of political action or of market action. It is gener-
ally the groups with lower litigation costs that also have the greatest
incentive to litigate: it is they who, absent resistance, will be most
consistently saddled with liability under Calabresi-style common law
rules.
To the extent parties affected by common law rulemaking can
alter the rules derived through the court system to their advantage,
they will attempt to do so. The fact that parties often are willing to
pay quite substantial premiums for higher-quality legal services 73 in-
dicates that higher-quality legal services have an incremental prod-
uct, i.e., are more likely to prevail than lower quality services.74 The
expenditure of resources is therefore likely to correlate, at least to
some degree, with result. Groups better able to muster resources
will succeed more frequently in establishing favorable legal rules
71 See G. CALABRESI, Supra note 66.
72 Id.
73 By higher-quality services, I mean simply legal services believed a priori by the
client to be more likely to achieve a successful outcome.
74 Prices of legal services vary substantially, yet higher-priced practitioners do not
apparently lack business. Price variation is indicative of product differentiation and vari-
ation in quality. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM,
pts. I and H (1985); Arthur Denzau, Litigation Expenditures as Private Determinants ofJudicial
Decisions: A Comment, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1979); Landes & Posner, supra note 70; Peter
J. Menell, A Note on Private Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 41 (1983); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); George L. Priest, Regulating the Content and
Volume of Litigation: An Economic Analysis, 1 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 163 (1982); Steven
Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the
Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
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than groups less able to do so. Yet it is just this ability to muster
resources, to act collectively as a group, that defines the groups
likely to succeed in the political context.
If cohesive groups can structure common law rules to serve
their interests, then they will have every incentive to resist changes
in the common law that arise from political sources. Such groups
will often assume the role of resisting political actions. Whenever
their goals have already been achieved through the courts, politics
represents a threat to gains already made.75 Whether they will seek
to preserve advantages gained through the legal system by resisting
political change, or, alternatively, to achieve those advantages by
political action and then preserve them by resisting legal challenges,
will depend simply on the relative costs of those two courses of ac-
tion. In many cases, it will surely be cheaper and more reliable to
seek to establish common law rules, buttressed by stare decisis, than
to rely on the shifting vagaries of politics. In any case, it seems im-
possible to predict which of those two routes will be chosen. Clos-
ing off one route by means of the anti-political approaches
advocated by public choice writers will surely lead to an emphasis on
the other. If the public choice reforms give institutional advantages
to those interest groups resisting change arising via the political sys-
tem, these groups will be better able to preserve the gains they se-
cure through the courts. 76
The organizationally effective group, therefore, is likely to view
the common law outcome, and potential change in that outcome
through political activity, as alternatives; the choice between them
will be determined by a belief as to which will yield the highest net
present value. When regulation is not sought then it must be pre-
sumed to yield less net value to the group than alternative courses
of action. The decision by an interest group not to seek regulation
of its industry cannot be viewed as benign. The unregulated state,
in which liability is determined by litigation and common law rules,
75 It is, of course, possible that such groups may use the political system to ensure
by statute that which the judicial system has already invented. An example is the system
of limited liability for corporate shareholders, which originally arose in judicial doctrine
and is now prescribed by statute in virtually all jurisdictions. See generally Frank H. Eas-
terbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liabiliiy and the Corporation, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 89
(1985); Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Lim-
ited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. ToRo~rro LJ. 117 (1980); Robert W. Hamilton, The
Corporate Entity, 49 Tax. L. REV. 979 (1971).
76 Obviously, if courts assign liability to the organizationally efficient group, then
their best course of action is to overturn court action through legislation. If, on the
other hand, the courts assign liability elsewhere, then political action will represent a
threat to their courtroom successes. Indeed, one reason public choice theorists find so
little legislation public-regarding may be that interest groups consistently oppose the
passage of such legislation, possibly because they are favored under the common law.
See supra note 20.
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may be preferred by the politically effective group and is, in any
case, itself the product of special interest logic.
7 7
Common law outcomes cannot, therefore, be used as a bench-
mark of optimality. If a special interest group is assigned liability,
rightly or wrongly, that assignment will be resisted by subsequent
litigation or legislative action; sometimes the former will be the
lower cost strategy, sometimes the latter will be. Eliminating the
option of legislative action will divert rent-seeking to the courts,
where the same cost advantages that make such groups politically
effective may also imply their litigational success. On the other
hand, if liability is assigned elsewhere by the courts, the same forces
imply that that outcome will not generally be altered legislatively
and that litigational attacks will often be successfully resisted; pro-
posals that impede legislative action will help to preserve those lia-
bility assignments. If affirmative governmental (i.e., nonjudicial)
action is biased because politics is biased, then afortiori common law
outcomes must also be biased, because the same forces that bias
politics also affect legal outcomes.
B.
When, however, a transaction is entirely private, and depends
neither on regulatory action nor on any particular judicial assign-
ment of legal right, the opportunities for more effective groups to
benefit from their strengths is at a minimum. The Coase theorem
tells us that legal assignments of rights or liabilities are irrelevant to
the efficiency of market solutions when transactions are costless. 78
Individual incentives ensure that all mutually beneficial transactions
occur. As Calabresi demonstrated, traditional sources of alleged
market failure simply present opportunities for mutually beneficial
transactions which eliminate the inefficiency. 79 No government ac-
tion can change an outcome arrived at in these circumstances with-
out making at least one party worse off, and possibly both.
It is in this idealized world of zero transactions costs that the
special interest model has typically been applied. Because markets
can in this world circumvent any potential market failure, the role of
government is necessarily limited. It may benefit interest groups to
seek politically provided commodities8 ° that reduce the welfare of
their trading partners-in short, to use the state for purely coercive
purposes, to force transactions on unwilling trading partners, or to
77 See Denzau, supra note 74.
78 Coase, supra note 61, at 101-04.
79 Calabresi, supra note 61, at 70-73.
80 See supra note 31.
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alter the terms of transactions. 8 1 In such circumstances, govern-
ment action has least justification, and safeguards against its wrong-
ful use are most attractive.
Absent those circumstances, 82 however, the case breaks down.
When transactions costs cannot be ignored, 83 the legal regime is no
longer irrelevant.8 4 Since the law cannot be relied upon to be free
of special interest influence, and hence is not necessarily optimal,
there can be no principled assurance that governmental solutions
are not an improvement on the imperfect market.8 5 Creating biases
against the use of government runs the risk of forcing reliance on
81 This is the model implicitly assumed by standard public choice doctrine: that in
the absence of government, markets would work optimally. See, e.g., Paul Rubin, DEREG-
ULATION, REREGULATION, AND THE MYTH OF THE MARKET, (Boalt Hall School of Law, Pro-
gram in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 88-8, 1988). Since members of the
politically effective group could not in any case be forced into an economic transaction
under normal market rules, additional government action to prevent coercion (and
hence non-optimal transactions) is unnecessary. Government makes non-optimal trans-
actions possible, in this view, but will never be necessary to prevent such transactions
beyond normal police powers. Hence, barriers against additional government action are
desirable: they foster more efficient markets. No price need be paid in terms of fore-
gone governmental actions; such actions serve no purpose in any case, because the mar-
ket handles such problems more efficiently.
82 Peltzman notes that the "public interest" model of regulation "comes perilously
close to treating regulation as a free good." Peltzman, supra note 1, at 212. Failing to
recognize the importance of transactions costs in private markets makes a comparable
mistake about private transactions. As Farrell points out, the condition which renders
the Coase theorem operative-the absence of private information-is not only implausi-
ble, it renders the decentralization result embodied in private markets irrelevant, since
in these circumstances a centralized authority in principle could direct resources equally
effectively. Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 116
(1987). Indeed, Farrell notes that, even compared to a highly imperfect governmental
authority, the superiority of private markets in allocating resources efficiently cannot be
assured. Id. at 124.
83 Cases involving non-negligible transactions costs are an enormously important
category of economic transactions. If transactions costs were negligible, the role of the
courts would be minimal, since costless market transactions would replace the legal
mechanism. In contract law, if legal rules were clear and impervious to change through
litigation, there would be no point in challenging a valid assertion of legal right. Many
contract cases, therefore, must involve non-negligible transactions costs. All torts in-
volve transactions costs, since they are by nature involuntary interactions. In all such
cases, the risk of litigation is, ex ante, preferred by the parties to market interaction and
must be less expensive than the perceived transactions costs.
84 Cf John Sutton, Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction, 53 REv. EcON.
STUD. 709 (1986) (reviewing economic literature concluding that bargaining is ineffi-
cient if each party has information not available to the other).
85 Obviously, this is an entirely empirical issue, one that must be approached on a
case-by-case basis. There is no way to predict that any government response will be
even more costly than a failed market transaction in every case of market failure. Build-
ing barriers against government action, however, makes exactly that presumption. Far-
rell suggests that an appropriate role for government is not necessarily to achieve
optimality, but to bring the parties to a position from which they can privately negotiate,
from a position in which private negotiation was not possible. Farrell, supra note 82, at
125.
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markets exactly when they are least reliable.8 6 Justification for gov-
ernment intervention exists when errors made by common law
courts are unlikely to be mitigated by Coaseian neutrality. Since
similar vulnerability to organizationally efficient groups seems to be
present in both courts and legislatures, the choice between the two
is hardly clear-cut.
When markets do fail, governmental action may enhance wel-
fare. Nevertheless, there may be some who will be harmed by such
action. Interest groups may therefore oppose regulation, and seek
its removal when it exists. In effect, each market failure develops a
constituency that benefits from the continued existence of the mar-
ket failure, and that therefore has an incentive to oppose a govern-
mental remedy. Members of cartels, or monopolists generally,
prefer market failure to efficient but competitive rates of return be-
cause the market failure is the source of their monopoly profits.
Similarly, the failure of the courts to assign liability for external
costs8 7 to the appropriate party, or to assign property rights com-
pletely, is likely to call forth the opposition of that party to legisla-
tive correction of the error.
The same organizational advantages which promote special in-
terest legislation therefore make public-regarding legislation un-
likely. Cartels inherently involve small groups likely to be politically
effective (in the sense of offering large effective bribes to policymak-
ers), since smaller cartels have lower enforcement costs than do
large cartels.8 8 Similarly, smaller groups will typically be the lower-
cost avoider in externality situations, since their organizational effi-
ciency reduces their costs of undertaking transactions.8 9 Obviously,
therefore, failure to address market imperfections may benefit small
and politically effective groups, who will use their organizational ad-
vantages to oppose correction of the imperfection.
Suppose, for example, that a simple cartel enabled its members
to extract monopoly rents from consumers of a product.90 Let us
86 The failure of markets to complete any mutually desirable transaction, for
whatever reason, is treated here as a relevant market failure.
87 Torts, transactions in which the costs of perpetrators' actions are imposed upon
victims, may be seen as a form of externality.
88 EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMIcs: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 343-44 (1988).
89 Indeed, non-internalized externalities are more likely in the presence of large
groups. Because their organizational costs are lower, small groups may be able to inter-
nalize any external effects of the actions of one group member on other group members,
whereas if actions of group members affect persons outside the group, they are likely to
be beyond the group's reach. The continuing existence of non-internalized externalities
may well indicate that courts have not placed the burden on the lowest-cost avoider or
internalizer; any change in that status quo arising from legislative action can only work
against the interests of the small group, which will therefore oppose such actions.
90 Some have argued that natural monopoly would be better left unregulated in any
case if the monopolist must bid for the right to be the monopolist. Harold Demsetz,,
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assume what is surely typical, that the consumers of the product are
more numerous, more heterogeneous, more costly to communicate
with, and less vitally interested, than are the members of the indus-
try cartel.91 The public choice model would thus predict that the
government will not prevent organizationally efficient cartels from
acting as such. The cartel members themselves are a constituency
for the continued existence of the cartel.
Of course, antitrust laws92 are designed to remedy exactly such
situations. 93 Nevertheless, resources devoted to public antitrust en-
forcement are limited, and prosecutors presumably must choose
among violators when allocating resources for enforcement. One
can easily imagine that the unfortunate parties selected for the gov-
ernment's attention may be those that are uniquely politically vul-
nerable. These parties are likely to be members of cartels
sufficiently large or diverse to encounter organizational difficul-
ties-in short, exactly those cartels least likely to survive in any
case. 94 In this view, antitrust policy is more likely to pose a threat to
small firms in large and inefficient cartels than to large, established
firms in more effective cartels, though the policy goals of antitrust
might be better served by the reverse.95
The solution to such difficulties, it would seem, is not to sus-
pend antitrust enforcement altogether, but to expand it, to reduce
Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 55 (1968); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly
and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 549 (1969); GeorgeJ. Stigler & Claire Friedland,
What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5J.L. & EcoN. 1, 11-12 (1962). This
argument, however, does not apply to the cartel, which is able to function as such be-
cause of the economics of group organization. Why some cartels, like any other group,
form successfully and outbid other potential cartels for the right to function, while
others fail, remains largely unexplained. Robert Tollison, Public Choice and Regulation, 74
VA. L. REV. 339, 342 (1988).
91 Indeed, the public choice model of group action predicts that successful acquisi-
tion of monopoly power is more likely to be made by organizationally efficient groups.
See M. OLSON, supra note 3, at 143-44.
92 See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); Robinson-Patman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b (1988); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988); Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1988); Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1311-14, 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988).
93 The fundamentally public-regarding character of antitrust law has been con-
ceded by sources likely to be skeptical. Bork, for example, asserts that "the legislative
history of the Sherman Act ... displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of pro-
moting consumer welfare." ROBERT BoRK, THE ANTrrrusT PARADOX 61 (1978).
94 The greater the number of firms which are members of a cartel, the more likely it
will break down. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, supra note 88, at 343-44.
95 There is much to be said for this view of antitrust enforcement. At this late date,
the antitrust laws are, from the perspective of any particular industry, a datum, beyond
practical hope of elimination. The alternative is to alter the technical, and politically
invisible, rules of operation to make them as beneficial to the group as possible. In
short, the existence of antitrust policy expresses public-regarding legislative behavior,




the scope of prosecutorial discretion. 96 The existence of antitrust
laws represents a threat even to the large monopolist, who would
surely prefer to eliminate that threat. It is in an environment of
straightforward adherence to antitrust rules that enforcement will
most overtly serve public-interest goals; in an environment of lim-
ited resources and prosecutorial discretion, the rules will fail. The
goal must be to avoid circumstances in which each set of potential
defendants is well-equipped to resist its own prosecution.
Similar considerations apply to externalities. The classic rem-
edy, a tax on an externality-generating activity such as the output of
a polluting factory,97 in principle informs all parties of the burdens
their actions impose on others, who presumably could not otherwise
make their feelings known.98 If a tax were imposed on factory own-
ers, it seems elementary that, whatever its social justification, the tax
would impose an unwanted burden on them, and they could be ex-
pected to seek its termination.99 If they succeed, the public interest
is sacrificed to benefit an organizationally more efficient group that
constitutes a constituency against the tax.
Alternative remedies to externalities present similar problems.
Suppose property rights in the environment could be assigned to
one party or another; this would, in the absence of private informa-
tion, eliminate the externality completely.' 00 Nevertheless, the as-
signment of property rights will be opposed by the group that is
denied the right. Again, the organizationally more efficient group
should not (under Calabresian rules) be granted the property right,
since it can surmount the costs of bargaining more easily than the
less efficient group.' 0 Therefore, the more efficient group will re-
96 For a general discussion of dissatisfaction with the Reagan Administration's em-
phasis on deregulation, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1988, at 1, 60, col. 3.
97 A.C. PIGOU, supra note 28; see also R. BOADWAY, supra note 28.
98 R. BoADwAY, supra note 28. If the factory owner had incentive to exaggerate the
true value of the pollution to him in the hopes of extracting additional payments, the
externality might not be completely corrected. The complete assignment of property
rights will not alone eliminate the welfare losses associated with externalities, as some
have asserted, if parties continue to hold private information about their bargaining po-
sitions that is not available to their potential negotiating partners. Steven Cheung, The
Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16J.L. & ECON. 11 (1973); Farrell, supra note
82, at 117; Richard Stroup &John Baden, Externality, Proerty Rights, and the Management of
Our National Forests, 16 J.L. & ECON. 303 (1973).
99 How consumers and producers will share the burden of the tax depends, of
course, on the relative magnitudes of supply and demand elasticities for the industry
output. See EDGAR BROWNING & JACQUELINE BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 460-63 (1983).
100 See supra note 98.
101 G. CALABRESI, supra note 66, at 135, 150-52. Groups with lower costs of organi-
zational and collective action are likely to be those which can mount the most effective
bribe, as public choice theory presumes in the political context. Calabresi explains that
"the best briber" is likely to be the appropriate party to which costs of accidents should
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sist proper assignments of property rights. The rights will either be
inappropriately assigned to the party with lower transactions costs
or will fail to be assigned altogether. Even absent a clear property
rule, it is only transactions costs which prevent the parties from
reaching an enforceable contract to clarify rights in exchange for
appropriate consideration. In any case, the view that externalities
exist only because property rights have not been completely as-
signed begs the question: if courts have not assigned property
rights completely though they should have done so, then what ap-
peared to be a failure of the market in fact is a failure of common
law courts. In either case, a legislative remedy is necessary.
Some have argued that actual environmental protection statutes
(intended to remedy the problems created by externalities) bear lit-
de resemblance to such benign taxes.10 2 They argue that environ-
mental regulation creates conventional rents by serving as a cartel
mechanism for the benefit of existing firms, to the detriment of po-
tential industry entrants. In the initial federal system of environ-
mental control, access to environmental resources was controlled by
the enforcement of standards rather than through tradeable prop-
erty rights. These standards included differential pollution-control
requirements on new firms; these requirements limited the entry of
new competitors.' 0 3 Such arguments helped justify attacks on this
and other forms of social regulation in the 1980s.1
0 4
be assigned, because that party can most cheaply correct errors in the assignment. Id. at
150-52.
102 Michael Maloney & Robert McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality
Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99 (1982). Several observers have used public choice theory
to justify a view of environmental and other social regulation as fundamentally a cartel
mechanism. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY (1984);
Robert Crandall, Clean Air and Regional'Protectionism, 2 BROOIuNGs REV. 17 (1983); Ann
Bartel & Lacy Glenn Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA 's
Impact, 28 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1985). In general, however, the public choice movement's
attack on health and safety regulation has been more muted than its attack on traditional
price and entry regulation, has focused on its inefficiency rather than its venality, and
has suggested alternatives like taxation or reliance on the common law as more efficient.
See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 96-120, 261-84 (1982); R. POSNER,
supra note 59, at 279-81; Richard Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Rela-
tions in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 655, 678-86.
103 For example, the 1970 Clean Air Act imposed standards on existing pollution
sources as a function of the ambient air quality, while new firms had to meet the strictest
standards regardless of local air quality. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)).
104 See MARTHA DERTHICK & PAULJ. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 33-34,
212-18 (1985). Social regulatory agencies were severely affected by the deregulation
movement of the 1980s. For example, between 1980 and 1989, the budgets of seven of
the ten largest social regulatory agencies-the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Coast Guard, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Food Safety Inspection Service,
the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the
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Whether or not existing social regulation creates such rents,
public choice explanations for the existence of social regulation are
nevertheless extremely implausible, as I explain below. If social
regulation cannot be plausibly explained by public choice theories,
the proposed restrictions on government become still more ques-
tionable. These proposals would, in general, fall equally on both
social regulation and traditional economic regulation, yet may not
be directed toward a meaningful problem in the area of social regu-
lation. Furthermore, even if public choice presented a satisfying ex-
planation for the existence of social regulatory programs,
restrictions on government like those discussed in this Article would
nevertheless be unsatisfying solutions: unless we are prepared to
tolerate the ongoing existence of substantial externalities, there is
little reason to impose new barriers to their correction.
Social regulation is a poor candidate for public choice explana-
tions. By its nature, it affects many industries at once; the involve-
ment of numerous industries and, therefore, large numbers of
affected shareholders and managers, poses serious free-rider
problems for an interest group trying to elicit action from its mem-
bers. 10 5 It usually imposes substantial compliance costs, which fall
on the very parties regarded as beneficiaries under a private interest
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, and the Economic Regulatory
Administration-contracted in real terms; of the remaining three, two grew by less than
5% over that period. By contrast, of the ten largest economic regulatory agencies at the
start of the 1980-89 period-the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corp., the Patent and Trademark Office, the Federal Reserve Board, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal
Trade Commission, and the Department ofJustice Antitrust Division-all but four grew
in real terms. The cumulative growth rate of economic regulatory agencies for the pe-
riod was double the average growth rate of social regulatory agencies: 26% versus 13%.
Melinda Warren & Kenneth Chilton, 1989 Federal Regulatory Budgets and Staffing: The Ef-
fects of the Reagan Presidency (Washington University Center for the Study of American
Business, 1988), cited in 3 REGULATrION 12 (1988). Much social deregulation has taken
the form of reliance on economic methods of regulation, and less on overt and inflexible
controls and standards. The Reagan Administration adopted two such policy reforms:
the institutionalization of economic analysis in the regulatory process, and the very lim-
ited use of emissions taxes and tradeable emissions rights. Roger Noll, Regulation After
Reagan, 3 REGULATION 18 (1988). For example, the Reagan EPA replaced regulatory
standards for lead emissions with transferable lead-use permits for gasoline refiners, and
allowed trading in agricultural water rights. Richard Stroup, Environmental Policy, 3 REG-
ULATION 47 (1988).
105 There has been little effort to resolve just who demands special interest legisla-
tion, from the potentially millions of stockholders in an affected industry to the agents,
managers, workers, and suppliers of the industry. Presumably all of these parties have
interests in the well-being of an industry affected by a piece of legislation. Macey's ob-
servation that "everyone agrees that it is the interest groups themselves that are making
the demands for favorable legislation" is of little help in this regard. See Macey, supra
note 11, at 228 n.24. The number of affected individuals could rapidly escalate beyond
any intuitive understanding of the upper size limit of a politically effective coalition.
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interpretation.'Or Indeed, the magnitude of those costs were widely
cited by affected industries as a reason to remove social regula-
tion.107 And social regulation is unlikely to be an entry-limiting de-
vice capable of awarding monopoly power to established firms; that
explanation presumes that existing firms would have monopoly
power but for the competitive pressure imposed on them by poten-
tial entrants. While some parts of American industry may indeed be
noncompetitive, that surely is not the rule, 10 8 and in any case those
industries which are competitive would have incentives to resist the
imposition upon them of compliance costs unrewarded by new mar-
ket power.
The special-interest explanation of social regulation also ig-
nores the recurring, short-lived focus of popular attention on partic-
ular matters of public concern. Social regulation has typically
resulted from widespread public pressure, which has prevailed over
the opposition of affected business interests. 0 9 The Meat Inspec-
tion Act 10 was rooted in "widespread enmity towards the large
meat packers," ' which arose partly in response to public outcry
following the publication of Sinclair Lewis's The Jungle; 112 this public
106 See, e.g., Murray Weidenbaum, The High Cost of Government Regulation, CHALLENGE,
Nov./Dec. 1979, at 32. The Weidenbaum study reports, for example, that the auto
safety and pollution requirements then present imposed costs of $7 billion on American
automakers through 1978, id. at 36; that OSHA standards imposed some $3.5 billion of
capital costs on domestic firms in 1978, id. at 37; that annual costs of pollution abate-
ment expenditures ran some $19.3 billion in 1977 and that some $361 billion would be
spent for that purpose between 1977 and 1986, id. at 37; and that paperwork and report-
ing requirements imposed an additional $63 billion in 1976. Id.
107 See ARTHUR ANDERSEN AND COMPANY, COSTS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION STUDY
FOR THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (1979). One estimate of the costs imposed by the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration, for example, placed the burden on industry
of complying with its regulatory standards at almost $2.7 billion per year. Murray
Weidenbaum & Robert DeFina, The Costs of Federal Regulation of Economic Activity (AEI
Reprint No. 88, 1978). Edward Denison estimated that pollution abatement and worker
safety and health programs of the federal government reduced the growth rate of the
U.S. economy in the late 1970s by some 0.35 percentage points. EDWARD DENISON, Ac-
COUNTING FOR SLOWER ECONOMIC GROWTH 128 (1979); see also J. Miller & J. Eisenach,
Regulatory Reform under Ronald Reagan, in THE FUTURE UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN 89-100
(W. Valis ed. 1981).
108 Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. No. 2 at
77 (1954).
109 For a discussion of opposition to the enactment of NEPA and the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, see RICHARD LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT:
NEPA AND rrs AFTERMATH 30-31 (1976); Helen Ingram, The Political Rationality of Innova-
tion: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLU-
TION 12-56 (A. Friedlander ed. 1978).
110 Act ofJune 30, 1906, ch. 3913, 34 Stat. 669 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 694
(1982)).
111 Robert Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1225 (1986).
112 See L at 1226.
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pressure also resulted in the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs
Act.113 The 1962 Drug Amendments were passed in the wake of
widespread public alarm over thalidomide. 114 Similarly, the social
regulation of the early 1970's came in reaction to mass public move-
ment.115 Public choice theory assumes the absence of an involved
public, and theories about what happens in its absence. In these
cases, however, public attention was both widespread and effective,
albeit only temporarily.
116
There is another reason to question the view that social regula-
tion has been sought by industry as a means to capture cartel-like
rents from government output restrictions. This view ignores an ex-
tensive body of evidence that many such regulatory initiatives have
reduced the stock market value of the regulated firms. 117 The sim-
113 Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, §§ 1-2, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Federal Food,
Drugs, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Star. 1059; see Rabin, supra note
111, at 1227.
114 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21 U.S.C.). See RIcHARD A. MERRILL & PETER BARTON Htn-r, FOOD AND
DRUG LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 353 (1980).
115 See Rabin, supra note 111, at 1281-84. For another description of the enactment
of the environmental and consumerist legislation of the period, see M. PERTSCHUK, supra
note 18, at 13-45.
116 More traditional economic regulation, by contrast, often originated in overt ef-
forts by favored business interests to obtain that legislation. For example, in the Pro-
gressive Era between 1890 and 1914, business interests sought reassurance through
regulation that business practices of the day were legally acceptable. See Rabin, supra
note 111, at 1220. Intense political combat between farmers and other users of railroad
shipping services, and the railroads themselves, which sought "freedom to engage in
pooling arrangements to 'rationalize' rates," produced the Interstate Commerce Act.
Id. at 1206-07. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1988)), resulted in important part from the lobbying efforts of
the National Civic Federation, a group of business and civic leaders who focused on
obtaining government assistance to create an environment in which business coopera-
tion and consolidation could thrive. As a result, the legislation failed to define a clear
pro-competitive mandate for the newly-created Federal Trade Commission. Rabin,
supra note 111, at 1221, 1223-1224. Vagueness in the definition of the regulatory
agency's mandate left clear opportunity for sustained special interest pressure on the
agency after public attention had passed.
117 James Bicksler & Patrick Hess, A Note on the Profits and Riskiness of Defense Contrac-
tors, 49J. Bus. 555 (1976) (finding no evidence of abnormal returns to defense contrac-
tors' securities during period of increased regulatory controls); Malcolm R. Burns, The
Competitive Effects of Trust-Busting: A Portfolio Analysis, 85 J. POL. ECON. 717 (1977) (anti-
trust dissolutions carried out under the Sherman Act reduced the equity values of af-
fected firms by between 9 and 16 percent); Roger G. Clarke, The Effect of FuelAdjustment
Clauses on the Systematic Risk and Market Values of Electric Utilities, 35J. FIN. 347 (1980) (uses
stock market excess returns analysis to demonstrate that the adoption of fuel adjustment
clauses between 1965 and 1974 resulted in no abnormal returns to shareholders of reg-
ulated electric utilities); GreggJarrell & Sam Peltzman, The Impact of Product Recalls on the
Wealth of Sellers, 9 3 J. POL. ECON. 512 (1985) (regulatory recalls of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts reduced the equity value of affected firms by about 6 percent; automobile recalls by
the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration resulted in losses of about 1.5%
of equity value); Sam Peltzman, The Effects of FTCAdvertising Regulation, 24 J.L. & EcON.
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ple reality is that the implementation of social regulation was often
opposed by affected business lobbying,"18 and for good reason.
As with externalities, similarly with public goods." t 9 Whatever
their public virtues, not all public goods are equally likely to be sup-
plied. The public goods most likely to be supplied through public
financing are those that coincide with private rewards. 120 The
greater the private good component of such a combined good, the
more likely free rider problems will be overcome; public goods (like
public-regarding legislation) with inadequate private goods compo-
nents are likely not to be supplied. Furthermore, parties who be-
lieve themselves taxed in excess of the benefits they derive from the
public good will oppose its provision or seek its termination. Since
the public good, by assumption, improves society's welfare in a utili-
tarian sense, it is plausible that the group opposing the action will
be smaller and thus more effective than the group supporting it.
In sum, when a market failure occurs, there may be a constitu-
ency formed by that market failure which will resist legislative efforts
to correct any resulting inefficiency. 12 Thus, failure of the legisla-
403 (1981) (deceptive advertising cases brought by the FTC were found to reduce the
net worth of affected firms by 3 percent); Paul H. Rubin, R. Dennis Murphy & Gregg
Jarrell, Risky Products, Risky Stocks, I REGULATION 35, 36 (1988) (Consumer Product
Safety Commission product recalls "are very costly, resulting in large drops in the stock
prices of affected firms."); William Schwert, Public Regulation of National Securities Ex-
changes: A Test of the Capture Hypothesis, 8 BELLJ. EcoN. 128 (1977) (proposal of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 in Congress significantly reduced New York and American Stock
Exchange seat prices); Robert I. Chien & Roger B. Upson, Returns to Drug Industry Com-
mon Stocks: An Alternative Measure of Economic Profitability (1978) (unpublished manuscript,
U. of Minnesota Graduate School of Business) (revision of proposed legislation to give
Food and Drug Administration new powers resulted in decline of 11 percent in pharma-
ceutical firms' share values); R. Ruback, The Effect of Discretionary Price Control Decisions on
Equity Values (1980) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester, School
of Management) (finding that violations of price controls detected and punished by reg-
ulatory commission caused reductions in the equity values of offending firms).
118 See, e.g., Weidenbaum, supra note 106, at 32:
It needs to be recognized that impetus for most of the expansion in
government power over business is not being provided by the industries
being regulated. Generally, they have shown minimum enthusiasm for
EPA, OSHA, ERISA, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), and so on. If anything, the companies claim that the "benefits"
to them of these regulations are negative. The pressures for the new
style of regulation come, rather, from a variety of citizen groups con-
cerned primarily with noneconomic aspects of our national life-environ-
mentalists, consumer groups, labor unions, and civil rights organizations.
119 The concept of public goods has a long history in economic literature. It was
first formalized by Paul Samuelson in 1954. See Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public
Expenditure, 36 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 386 (1954).'
120 See M. OLsON, supra note 3, at 51, 133-34.
121 I do not mean to exclude the possibility that there may be legitimate reasons for
governmental action other than economic efficiency. For example, there may be redis-
tribution for reasons other than private interest; obviously, the parties likely to bear the
costs of that redistribution may oppose it. Nevertheless, there is no clear criterion of the
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tive process results not only from active lobbying on behalf of pri-
vate interest legislation, but also from the active resistance of
groups which benefit from the absence of legislation. Their resist-
ance is as much a problem for the democratic system as their search




If the existence of regulation leads us to suspect the operation
of private interest politics, the absence of regulation should lead us
to suspect the very same. When we observe, for example, a gener-
ally unregulated industry, that may be a triumph of a public-spirited
defense of the free market-or a failure to give adequate representa-
tion to the public will. When an industry is actively regulated, a pri-
vate interest group may have triumphed, or may have been
defeated. When we observe successful deregulation, the special in-
terests may just have been defeated-or did they just win the field?
We cannot completely trust any private ordering to be free of
the taint of special interest. Nor can we rely on the political system
to generate consistently desirable results. At best we can build ex-
plicit safeguards against the use of government for private ends.
Limits on campaign contributions, ethical standards for public offi-
cials, and similar conventional solutions to the problem of private
interest offer far more hope for the elimination of private interest
from our public affairs than do one-sided limits on the role of
government.
public interest in this case, as there is with economic efficiency. For that reason, the
argument is phrased in terms of economic considerations, but no loss of generality is
intended.
122 Some may believe that private outcomes, whatever their source, have an overrid-
ing moral validation simply because those results are private. See ActiveJudges, supra note
12. That is not, however, the basis on which the public choice literature has grounded
its attack on rent-seeking legislation; that attack has had its appeal because it appeared
to be based on distributionally neutral and uncontroversial criteria.
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